The Scientific Soldier

In today's world, Operations Research provides scientific tools for decision-making across various fields. Industries such as logistics and supply chain management, healthcare, education, agriculture, military operations, telecommunications, and business and industry sectors all benefit from the application of Operations Research techniques. These techniques encompass a range of applied mathematical methods, including statistical and data analysis, linear and nonlinear regression, queuing theory, and stochastics, as well as linear and nonlinear programming.

Moreover, Operations Research practitioners have access to a wide array of off-the-shelf models, simulations, and commercial software packages. Decision-makers utilize Operations Research as a vital component of an analytical approach to their decision-making processes.

Operations Research (OR) originated from military applications, where it was utilized by military commanders during wartime to address logistical challenges, optimize troop movements, and enhance decision-making processes on the battlefield. Initially developed to solve complex problems faced in military operations, OR methodologies encompassed mathematical models, statistical analysis techniques, and optimization algorithms to provide data-driven insights for informed decision-making. Its success in military contexts led to its widespread adoption across various civilian sectors, where similar challenges in resource allocation, logistics, and decision-making existed, highlighting the enduring legacy of its wartime origins.

Operations Research was formally established in the late 1930’s at a time when Adolf Hitler announced his intentions to create a Luftwaffe equal to the combined air forces of Britain and France.   To defend Britain against an attack from Germany, the British government established radar installations along the coast to provide the Royal Air Force (RAF) with early warning of incoming German strikes.  However, in 1938, tactical exercises demonstrated that the system fell short of its operational requirements.  A.P. Rowe, Superintendent of the Bawdsey Research Station, proposed that research into operational aspects rather than technical aspects of the system should be conducted – thus coining the phrase “operational research.” These studies led to the establishment of formal techniques of command and control of fighter versus bomber operations in the Battle of Britain.

Operational Research spread to other organizations throughout the British military establishment. Operational Research sections in the Coastal Command and the Admiralty were responsible for developing convoy procedures to keep Britain’s lifeline to North America open, perfecting the use of airborne radar in detecting U‐boats, and shutting down the U‐boat transit lanes from bases along the Bay of Biscay to open ocean operating areas. Other sections were established to support the Army (primarily the Antiaircraft Command), as well as Royal Air Force Bomber Command where studies in navigation accuracy, radar performance, and the employment of chaff contributed to improved bombing accuracy and aircraft survivability during the area bombing of German cities.  Recent studies in the United Kingdom indicate that the area bombing campaign undertaken by Bomber Command in 1942, and espoused by the Commander‐ in‐Chief, Sir Arthur Harris, may have been validated by the misapplication of operations research and was of less impact on the German war economy and civilian morale then was believed at the time.

Upon the entry of the United States into the war, the Navy took the lead in establishing operations research organizations.   In March 1942 the Mine Warfare Operations Research Group (MWORG) was established at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory.  MWORG went through numerous reorganizations throughout the war, and ultimately supported the Army Air Forces XXI Bomber Command in planning Operation Starvation in the Far East – the mining of Japan’s Inland Sea.    During the campaign, more than 1,000 ships were damaged or sunk, including over 100 naval vessels, greatly reducing Japanese shipping in this area.

In March 1942, Captain Wilder D. Baker, Commander of Destroyer Squadron 31 formed the Anti‐Submarine Warfare Unit in Boston.  It did not take the Unit long to conclude that the major cause of America’s poor Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) campaign was inadequate tactical doctrine.    By the end of March, Baker approached Professor Philip M. Morse of MIT and asked him to undertake the role of lead analyst in what would be called the ASW Operations Research Group (ASWORG).  One of the first issues ASWORG tackled was the problem of search, by ship or plane, for submarines and warships.  Its first memorandum, published 1 May 1942, was titled “Preliminary Report on the Submarine Search Problem.”  The recommendations in this report were immediately put into effect and improved the tactics of convoy protection and the search for U‐boats.    As successes grew, ASWORG gradually undertook studies in the Pacific, first on submarine operations, then naval air activities, and finally on all aspects of operations. During this time Operations Research was successfully employed in both the Army and Army Air Forces as well.

Operations Research emerged from wartime necessity, serving as a vital tool for military commanders to address complex logistical challenges and optimize decision-making processes. Its legacy extends beyond the battlefield, permeating civilian sectors and shaping strategic planning and decision-making frameworks across various industries. Today, Operations Research remains indispensable, offering invaluable insights and methodologies for navigating complex problems and achieving optimal outcomes in an ever-evolving world.

(Resource: Defense Science Board Advisory Group on Defense Intelligence. (2009). Report on Operations Research Applications for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Department of Defense, USA)